The CKU railway project had been finalised by signing agreement in Beijing on 6 June, 2024 between the three countries. The construction is supposed to start in October 2024 and should take a little over 6 years, according to the preliminary agreements.1 With the overall length of 523 kilometres, railway will pass 260-280 kilometres along Kyrgyz territory, 50 kilometres along Uzbek territory and 213 kilometres in China.
Starting from Kashgar in western China, the railway proceeds to Torugart — Arpa — Makmal, then Kyrgyz Jalal-Abad and would reach Andijan in south-eastern Uzbekistan. From there the route would get connected to Uzbekistan’s existing railway system with connection to Turkmenistan and further Iran.
Initially the talk about building this route evolved in 1997 when three countries signed a memorandum of understanding to construct a railway. Later CKU became part of Chinese One Belt, One Road initiative, presenting alternative to existing northern links via Kazakhstan and Russia. Supposedly it would reduce the existing land route from China to Europe by 900 kilometres and save up to 7 or 8 days.
China’s considerations
The key decision to invest and fund the CKU railway project comes from Beijing. So far China already has steady connections to the South Caucasus, Middle East and Europe via Kazakhstan and Russia, with both countries enjoying unrestricted access to transit revenues and close to zero competition in this part of the world.
Amid the geopolitical tensions between the West and Russia, with China explicitly supporting the latter, Beijing is looking for every opportunity to expand its options for free and unreserved trading worldwide. The probability of restricted maritime transportation has also increased, particularly with frequent small-scale skirmishes in South China Sea and the ongoing conflict with the Philippines.
Kyrgyzstan’s considerations
CKU would allow Kyrgyzstan to further integrate into Central Asian trade routes along with providing an opportunity to escape logistical lockdown. Another important fact to consider is the tangible perspective to connect the North and the South of the country by railroad, which became almost strategic task for the current Kyrgyz leadership; not only the two parts appear geographically distant, connected only by the road which cannot operate in winter.
At the same time, CKU can turn into a rather challenging task: out of Bishkek’s 4 bln. USD external debt, 43% belongs to Chinese banks making the country heavily indebted to China already. Many experts continue to warn that with the CKU railway project unfolding, Kyrgyzstan might indeed fall into debt trap from China.
Uzbekistan’s considerations
Uzbek leadership had long been planning to reach open seas through its Southern (via Afghanistan) and Western (via Turkmenistan and Iran) borders, which resulted in considering several ambitious logistical projects.
Uzbekistan’s share of the CKU railway tracks is significantly less comparing to the Kyrgyz section. Additionally, the country already has quite an extensive railway system, which also makes Tashkent less desperate to pursue this project. Having a railway connection to Kazakhstan, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan, Uzbek authorities regard CKU as another opportunity to reach greater connectivity in the region.
